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DIRECTOR LIABILITY:
A CLICHÉ IN NORTH DAKOTA
BRIAN WINROW*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of personal accountability within the corporate realm has
become a hotly debated topic in response to the seemingly endless cases of
corporate corruption.1 A plethora of cases spearheaded the call for corporate governance reform in order to hold corporate wrongdoers personally
and criminally accountable for their malfeasance.2 The recent corporate
governance reform started with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act modified the governance, reporting, and
disclosure rules for public companies, and exposed unscrupulous officers to
lengthy prison sentences.4 While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act facilitated the
prosecution of numerous corporate officers, directors often emerged unscathed.5 As a result, the scope of a director’s liability has come under
scrutiny from scholars, creditors, investors, and legislatures.6
In 2007, the North Dakota Legislature enacted the North Dakota
Publicly Traded Corporations Act (Act), which added chapter 10-35 to the
North Dakota Century Code.7 The Act permits corporations to elect to be
governed under the new “shareholder friendly” statute.8 The Act provides

*
Brian Winrow is an Assistant Professor of Business Law with the School of Business at
Winona State University. Mr. Winrow was formerly an Assistant Professor at Emporia State
University. He graduated from the University of South Dakota with both his J.D. and M.B.A.
Prior to commencing his career as an Assistant Professor, he practiced full time in the state of
New Mexico.
1. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 928-37 (2003) (reviewing the corporate
scandals of 2001, including Enron, WorldCom, and the legislative response of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
2. Id.
3. See Jaclyn Taylor, Fluke or Failure? Assessing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act After United
States v. Scrushy, 74 UMKC L. REV. 411, 421 (2005).
4. Id.
5. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1627 (2002) (discussing director
liability in corporate corruption cases, including Enron).
6. Id.
7. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-01 (2007).
8. See id. § 10-35-03(1) (“This chapter applies only to a publicly traded corporation meeting
the definition of a ‘publicly traded corporation’ . . . during such time as its articles state that it is
governed by this chapter.”).
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shareholders with enhanced rights and control in the operation and management of the corporation.9 By enacting this legislation, North Dakota made a
significant stride in attempting to gain market share in the lucrative market
of serving as a viable state of incorporation for businesses, a label that
Delaware has touted for decades.10 If North Dakota is successful in attracting more corporations to incorporate within the state, especially under the
guise of “shareholder friendly” statutes, it will be critical for directors to
understand their scope of liability for the actions of the corporation.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the different forms of director
liability in North Dakota, and to compare and contrast the scope of director
liability in North Dakota to that of directors in Delaware. Part II of this
Article addresses the role of directors, the fiduciary duties directors owe to
the corporation and shareholders, and directors’ potential internal liability.11
Part III focuses on the relevant case law within North Dakota and Delaware,
as well as surrounding states possessing similar statutes, to ascertain the
judicial interpretation and treatment of the respective statutes.12 Part IV
addresses the theory of external liability.13 In Part IV, the concept of
limited liability is discussed, as well as the equitable remedy of piercing the
corporate veil.14 This Article concludes in Part V with an analysis of federal legislation designed to expand the scope of a director’s prospective
liability.15
II. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The board of directors fulfills a vital role in the corporate governance
of an organization.16 The board of directors oversees the business affairs
and management of the corporation on behalf of the shareholders.17 The
number of directors who sit on the board is set out in either the corporate
9. John F. Olson, Is the Sky Really Falling? Shareholder-Centric Versus Director-Centric
Corporate Governance, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 295, 298 (2008).
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II (discussing the fiduciary duties a director owes the corporation).
12. See infra Part III (discussing corporate constituency statutes as well as the scrutiny
afforded to the gross negligence of a director within the respective states).
13. See infra Part IV (explaining the scope of internal liability arising from the piercing of
the corporate veil).
14. See infra Part IV.C.1. (discussing the eight factor balancing test in ascertaining whether a
plaintiff can pierce the corporate veil).
15. See infra Part V (explaining the purview of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
16. See Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509, 517
(2008) (discussing the role of a director).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-32(1) (2007); see also Nadelle Grossman, Director
Compliance With Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12
FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 400 (2007) (explaining the concept of corporate
governance).
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bylaws or articles of incorporation.18 In North Dakota, the board must
consist of one or more directors.19 In carrying out his or her managerial
function, a director on the board is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements prepared or presented by either officers or employees
that the board member believes to be competent.20 A member of the board
of directors may also rely on counsel, public accountants, or other professionals, if a director believes that person is acting within their scope of expertise.21 Additionally, a committee of the board, acting within the board’s
designated authority, on which a director does not serve, may be relied
upon.22 While a director has the express authority to rely upon a committee, the board member needs to be cognizant of the prospective liability
incurred from the fiduciary nature of the position.
The potential for director liability can arise internally or externally.
Internal liability consists of a director’s potential liability to the corporation
or to the shareholders of the corporation.23 This theory of liability is based
upon a director’s fiduciary responsibility owed to the corporation and
shareholders.24 The fiduciary duties include the duty of good faith, care,
and loyalty.25 When a shareholder believes a director has breached his or
her fiduciary duty, the shareholder may bring a derivative action against the
corporation.26 A derivative action is used when all the shareholders of a
corporation have experienced a similar injury.27 However, if a shareholder
alleges injury independent of all the other shareholders, the shareholder
could bring a direct action.28 The second form of liability, external liability,
arises from an aggrieved creditor seeking to pierce the corporate veil.29
External liability is discussed further in Part IV.
The remainder of Part II focuses on the scope of a director’s internal
liability. More specifically, section A discusses the fiduciary duties of a

18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-33.
19. Id.
20. § 10-19.1-50(2)(a).
21. § 10-19.1-50(2)(b).
22. § 10-19.1-50(2)(c).
23. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1980).
24. North Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99
(Del. 2007).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(1).
26. Mark M. Graham, Delaware Post-Merger Derivative Suit Standing and Demand
Requirements: Professional Management Associates, Inc. v. Coss, 25 J. CORP. L. 631, 648 (2000).
27. Atkins v. Hibernia Corp., 182 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Palowsky v. Premier
Bancorp, Inc., 597 So. 2d 543, 545 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).
28. Id.
29. See infra Part IV (stating that creditors and aggrieved third parties can impose liability
against a director if they can satisfy the eight factor balancing test to pierce the corporate veil).
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director, which are comprised of the duty of good faith, fair dealing, and
loyalty.30 Section B discusses the prospective liability of a director for
gross negligence, comparing and contrasting the law in North Dakota and
Delaware.31 Section C focuses on the standard of review against which a
director’s actions or inactions will be measured.32 Part II concludes with
section D, which focuses on a director’s right to indemnification.33
A. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The fiduciary duties of a corporation’s directors are generally governed
by the law of the state in which the business incorporates.34 In North
Dakota, a director is bound by the fiduciary duties in Section 10-19.1-50 of
the North Dakota Century Code.35 If a director fails to comply with their
respective duties the corporation or shareholder may seek monetary damages from a director.36 Since the directors serve in a position of trust in
relation to the corporation and shareholders, they maintain a fiduciary
relationship.37 As fiduciaries, the directors owe the corporation and shareholders legal and ethical duties of good faith, care, and loyalty, which
cannot be eliminated within the articles of incorporation.38
In Delaware, directors’ actions are governed by a statute similar to that
of North Dakota.39 The Delaware statute permits a corporation to adopt a
provision designed to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director
for breach of a fiduciary duty as a director.40 In Delaware, however, a
corporation may not eliminate or limit a director’s liability for: (i) any
breach of a director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders;
(ii) acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) improper payment of dividends; or

30. See infra Part II.A (comparing and contrasting North Dakota and Delaware law as it
pertains to a director’s liability for beach of his or her fiduciary duty).
31. See infra Part II.B (discussing the liability for gross negligence, and whether that liability
can be waived).
32. See infra Part II.C (discussing the business judgment rule and ordinary negligence).
33. See infra Part II.D (discussing a director’s right to be indemnified by the corporation).
34. Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(1) (2007).
36. See id. § 10-19.1-50(5) (explaining that a director’s monetary culpability for breach of
fiduciary duty can be eliminated within the articles of incorporation—liability is sought by a
shareholder by filing a derivative lawsuit).
37. Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary—Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your
Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479,
490 (2000).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5)(a)-(b).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
40. Id.
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(iv) any transaction from which a director derived an improper personal
benefit.41
1.

Duty of Good Faith

A director has a fiduciary duty to protect the corporation’s interests.42
A director occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and the
utmost good faith is required in the exercise of the powers conferred on a
director.43 Good faith is defined as honesty in the conduct of an act or
transaction.44 In order to fulfill the duty of good faith, a director must act in
a manner in which a director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of
the corporation.45 A director may breach the duty of good faith by engaging in undisclosed transactions with another company in which a director
has an interest determined to be unfair to the corporation.46 Moreover, the
directors of a corporation do not have a right to convert the corporation’s
assets for their own use, or make any self-serving disposition of assets at
the expense of the company.47
a.

North Dakota

The North Dakota Legislature enacted an expansive definition of the
best interest of the corporation.48 The North Dakota Century Code provides
directors with a significant amount of latitude in determining whether a
particular action is in the corporation’s best interest.49 In North Dakota, a
director is entitled to take into consideration the best interests of: (1) the
corporation; (2) the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors; (3) the economy; (4) societal considerations; and (5) the long- and
short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.50 This type of
inclusive statute, which, as of 1997 has been adopted in thirty states, is
referred to as a corporate constituency statute.51

41. See id.
42. Zakibe v. Ahrens & McCarron, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Mo. App. 2000).
43. Id.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-01(29) (2007).
45. Id. § 10-19.1-50(1).
46. Zakibe, 28 S.W.3d at 382.
47. Id.
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears,
1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 95 (1999). As of 1997, the following states had corporate constituency statues: AZ, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MA, MN, MI, MS, NE, NV,
NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, TX, VT, WI, and WY. Id.
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The corporate constituency statutes provide directors greater freedom
in executing their fiduciary duties by incorporating a range of statutorily
sanctioned factors in the decision-making process.52 The effect has been to
provide the directors with additional justification for pursuing a course of
action, thus thwarting the shareholder’s attempt to hold a director monetarily culpable for breaching the fiduciary duty of good faith.53 Corporate
constituency statutes expand the traditional notion and understanding of the
best interest of the corporation by incorporating extrinsic factors.54
While North Dakota has limited case law on corporate constituency,
guidance can be found in Smith v. Citation Manufacturing Company,55 an
Eighth Circuit case.56 In Citation Manufacturing Company, the defendant,
a director for Citation Manufacturing Company, sold to his other corporation $65,000 worth of equipment.57 A director’s other corporation subsequently filed for voluntary bankruptcy prior to paying for the equipment.58
The investors of Citation Manufacturing Company filed a suit against a
director for breach of fiduciary duty.59 The court opined that the failure of a
corporate director to exercise due diligence or good faith in a transaction
resulting in loss to a shareholder entitles the shareholder to recoup damages
from a director whose negligence caused the loss.60 A director who negligently causes the loss is liable to the shareholders to the extent of the loss. 61
While North Dakota has conferred the duty of good faith as one of the few
fiduciary duties that cannot be waived, Delaware courts have not traditionally recognized a separate duty of good faith.62
b.

Delaware

In Delaware, the requirement of good faith is ambiguous, stating only
that a director must act in the best interests of the shareholders.63 In an

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 587 S.W.2d 39 (Ark. 1979).
56. Citation Mfg. Co., 266 Ark. at 39.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id at 41.
61. Id.
62. Grossman, supra note 17, at 409.
63. Id. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (equating good faith with loyalty); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[T]he duty
to act in ‘good faith’ is merely a subset of a director’s duty of loyalty”); In re Gaylord Container
Corp. S’holder Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 (Del. Ch. 2000) (explaining that good faith is a “fresh”
way to refer to the duty of loyalty).
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attempt to narrow the definition and clarify the duty of good faith, the
Delaware Chancery Court has found two separate types of bad faith.64
First, the fiduciary duty of good faith can be violated when an inadequate
information-gathering process is employed.65 The emphasis is to focus on a
director’s requirement to use due diligence in making business decisions.66
The second type of bad faith occurs when a director makes a decision that
exceeds the bounds of reasonable judgment and appears unjustifiable on
any ground other than bad faith.67
Directors in Delaware, similar to North Dakota, are entitled to retain
consultants or other advisors in furtherance of making informed decisions.68
Directors are protected in their reliance on statements, information, and
reports furnished by advisors, so long as they do so in good faith and select
the advisors with reasonable care.69 This permits a director to delegate
authority and to rely upon others whom a director reasonably believes to be
acting within his or her area of expertise.
2.

Duty of Due Care

The duty of due care ensures that directors use a methodical and comprehensive information gathering process on which to base their decisions.70 The duty is intended to promote intelligent and informed decisions
on behalf of the corporation.71 The central focus of the duty of care is
procedural review.72 The duty of care requires directors to act on an
informed basis.73 In accomplishing this objective, directors are expected to
attend meetings, read reports, and inquire into alternative methods of
action.74

64. Grossman, supra note 17, at 410 (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996 )).
65. Grossman, supra note 17, at 410.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d at 780-81).
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2005).
69. Id.
70. Kimberly J. Burgess, Comment, Gaining Perspective: Directors’ Duties in the Context of
“No-Shop” and “No-Talk” Provisions in Merger Agreements, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 431,
433 (2001).
71. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 96 (Del. 2001).
72. Id.
73. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
74. Id. A board member is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements
prepared or presented by either officers or employees the board member believes to be competent;
counsel, public accountants, or other professionals a director believes is within the person’s scope
of expertise; or committees of the board acting within its designated authority and on which a
director does not serve. However, a director cannot rely upon the above information if a director
has knowledge that diminishes or makes the reliance unjustified. Id.
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North Dakota

In North Dakota, the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty cannot
be waived.75 While the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty are absolute, and cannot be waived, such restrictions are not afforded to the duty of
care.76 As a result, in North Dakota a corporation may limit or reduce the
monetary culpability owed by the corporation for the breach of the duty of
care.77 This allows directors to escape liability for failing to maintain the
standard of care, if the corporation elects to add a provision to that effect in
the articles of incorporation or bylaws.78
b.

Delaware

Smith v. Van Gorkom79 best illustrates Delaware’s judicial interpretation of the fiduciary duty of care.80 In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the board of directors had breached its duty of care by
approving a merger without receiving any information as to the merger,
with the exception of a statement by the chairman that the merger price was
fair.81 The Court held that such an anemic review violates Delaware’s code
on the merger of corporations, which requires that the directors make an
informed decision prior to approving a merger.82 More specifically, the
directors did not adequately investigate the agreed upon stock price for the
merger, were unaware of the intrinsic value of the business, and approved
the merger with a mere two hours of deliberations without advance notice.83
In Delaware, even if a director breaches the fiduciary duty of care, the
director may still avoid monetary damages.84 This occurs as the corporation is permitted to adopt a provision restricting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its shareholders for breach of the duty of
care.85 While there are certain fiduciary duties that cannot be limited or

75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5)(a), (b) (2007).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 10-19.1-50(5).
78. See id. (providing that a corporation can limit the scope of the board member’s liability
by incorporating a provision within the articles of incorporation). The waiver of liability, however, is only applicable for the duty of care and not the duty of loyalty or good faith. Id.
79. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
80. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 884; see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2005) (the respective boards must
adopt an agreement specifying the terms of the merger, the mode for incorporating the merger, as
well as other details pertinent to the merger).
83. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
84. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(B)(7).
85. Id.
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waived, the duty of care does not fall within the exception.86 As a result, a
director can escape monetary liability for breaching the duty of care.87
3.

Duty of Loyalty

The third hallmark fiduciary duty is a director’s duty of loyalty owed to
both the corporation and the shareholders.88 The duty of loyalty requires
that directors avoid transactions in which they have a conflict of interest
and will benefit from promoting a particular course of conduct.89 If a director does engage in a self-serving transaction, it is generally adjudged with
strict scrutiny to ensure a director did not violate the duty of loyalty.90
Subsections a and b discuss how the duty of loyalty is construed in North
Dakota and Delaware, respectively.91
a.

North Dakota

In helping define what is classified as impermissible behavior, North
Dakota has articulated the scope of a conflict of interest.92 A conflict of
interest can arise in transactions between a corporation and a director; between the corporation and a director of a related organization; or between
the corporation and an organization in which the corporation’s director has
a material financial interest.93 Moreover, the scope of the conflict of
interest encompasses any member of a director’s immediate family.94
However, even if a transaction which on its face falls within the purview of
the definition, will not be void or voidable in three distinct situations.95
First, a transaction will not be void or voidable if either the transaction was
favorable to the corporation at the time it was authorized, approved or
ratified.96 The second situation occurs when the material facts as to the
transaction and directors’ interest are fully disclosed to all shareholders and
the shareholders, with voting authority, by a two-thirds majority approve

86. Lloyd L. Drury, III, What’s the cost of a free pass? A Call for the Re-Assessment of
Statutes that Allow for the Elimination of Personal Liability for Directors, 9 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 99, 129 (2007).
87. See id. (stating that companies have exculpatory clauses within the articles waiving
director liability for breach of care).
88. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(B)(7).
89. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
90. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. Bechtel, 51 N.W.2d 174, 216 (Iowa 1952).
91. See infra Parts II.B.3.a-b (discussing the duty of loyalty in North Dakota and Delaware).
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-51(1) (2007).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 10-19.1-51(2).
96. Id. § 10-19.1-51(2)(a).
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the transaction.97 Finally, a transaction will not be void or voidable when
the facts of the transactions and directors’ interest are fully disclosed to the
board, with the board authorizing or approving the transaction with a
majority vote.98
In Cookies Food Products, Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distributing,
Inc.,99 an Eighth Circuit case, the court held that as a fiduciary, one may not
secure for oneself a business opportunity that in fairness belongs to the corporation.100 Moreover, the court found that a corporate director may, under
proper circumstances, transact business with the corporation including the
purchase or sale of property, but it must be done in good faith and with full
disclosure of the facts, and with the consent of all parties concerned.101
Even then, the burden is upon a director to establish his or her good faith,
honesty, and fairness.102 The self-serving transaction, however, will be
viewed by the trial court with skepticism and garner close scrutiny, and may
be nullified on slight grounds.103
b.

Delaware

In Delaware, the duty of loyalty requires a director to exercise undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation and place the best interests
of the corporation and its stockholders ahead of any interest of his or her
own.104 To avoid the need for a court determination of the fairness of every
challenged interested party transaction, there is a test in Delaware to determine whether an impermissible conflict exists.105 The test provides that a
transaction in which a director has an interest will not be void in one of two
instances.106 The first situation is satisfied if a majority of disinterested
directors authorize the transaction.107 The second method occurs when a
majority of stockholders, in good faith, authorizes the transaction after full
disclosure.108 A director is deemed disinterested if he or she does not

97. Id. § 10-19.1-51 (2)(b).
98. See id. § 10-19.1-51 (2)(c) (providing that a director with the conflict will not be counted
in determining whether a quorum existed and shall not vote).
99. 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988).
100. Cookies Food Products, Inc., 430 N.W.2d at 452 (citing Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins.
Co. of Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639, 660 (Iowa 1979)).
101. Id. (citing Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. Bechtel, 51 N.W. 2d 174, 216 (Iowa 1952)).
102. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 356-57 (Iowa 1972).
103. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co., 51 N.W.2d at 216.
104. Cede & Co. v. United Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
105. Id. at 365-66.
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2007).
107. Id.
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 44(a) (2005).
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appear on both sides of a transaction, nor expects to derive a material
personal financial benefit from the transaction.109
B. GROSS NEGLIGENCE
An interesting question arises in North Dakota as it pertains to the
gross negligence of the directors and their exposure to liability. The statutory language in North Dakota permits the corporation to reduce or eliminate a director’s liability to the corporation or its shareholders, with the
exception of the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty, by permitting the
corporation to add a provision to that effect in the articles of incorporation.110 Accordingly, a plain reading of the statute would indicate that a
director could avoid internal liability for their tortious conduct while acting
in their capacity as a director, if acting in good faith.111 Such an interpretation would indicate that a director would be immune for his or her gross
negligence.
While the North Dakota courts have not addressed a director’s scope of
culpability for gross negligence, in John Hancock Capital Growth
Management, Inc. v. Aris Corp.,112 the Delaware Chancery Court held that
the Delaware statute prevents the corporation or shareholders from bringing
an action against the directors based upon the gross negligence of the
directors.113 As a result, in Delaware a director who is grossly negligent,
but acts in good faith nonetheless, can avoid liability to the shareholders
and corporation if the corporation adopted such a provision within the
articles of incorporation.114
C. STANDARD OF CARE
The general standard by which the fiduciary duties are measured is the
objective reasonable person standard.115 The objective reasonable person
standard is expressed as the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.116 While at first blush it
appears that a director will be subjected to the same generic standard
proffered in cases involving basic tort law, a more lenient standard has been
devised whereby directors are allowed deference in carrying out their
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-51(5) (2007).
Id.
16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1515 (Del. Ch. 1990).
John Hancock Capital Growth Mgmt, Inc., 16 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1519.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(1).
Id.
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duties.117 This modified standard is commonly referred to as the business
judgment rule.118
The business judgment rule prohibits judicial inquiry into the actions of
the directors made in good faith in furtherance of a lawful and legitimate
corporate purpose.119 The rationale behind the business judgment rule is
twofold.120 First, it safeguards the board’s decisions and managerial authority from arbitrary attack.121 Second, it acknowledges that courts are ill
equipped to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments
that are the responsibility of the corporate directors.122 These business
judgments are based upon their individual capabilities and experiences that
peculiarly qualified them for the discharge of that responsibility.123
In addition to the business judgment rule, the corporate constituency
statute, enacted by the North Dakota Legislature, permits the corporation to
eliminate or reduce the monetary liability of directors in relation to the corporation and shareholders.124 While the general rule permits the limitation
or elimination of director liability, there are a few enumerated instances in
which a director’s liability cannot be limited.125 They include a director’s
breach of loyalty;126 acts or omissions not in good faith;127 and transactions
in which a director received improper personal benefits.128
While North Dakota utilizes the business judgment rule in determining
whether the directors breached their fiduciary duty, the scope of the directors’ actual duty has not been adequately litigated. Therefore, a plausible
argument can be made that it only covers “acts” of the directors. In Red
River Wings, Inc. v. Hoot, Inc.,129 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that the business judgment rule recognizes the court’s limitations as it
relates to having to analyze a director’s decision.130 Furthermore, the court
117. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 306-07 (1994) (discussing the standard under ordinary negligence and the business judgment rule).
118. Buckingham v. Weston Village Homeowners Ass’n, 1997 ND 237, ¶ 9, 571 N.W.2d
842, 844.
119. Lill v. Cavalier Rural Elec. Coop., 456 N.W.2d 527, 530 (N.D. 1990) (citing
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 554 (N.Y. 1990)).
120. Levandusky, 75 N.Y.2d at 539.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5) (2007).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 10-19.1-50(5)(a).
127. Id. § 10-19.1-50(5)(b).
128. Id. § 10-19.1-50(5)(d).
129. 2008 ND 117, 751 N.W.2d 206.
130. Red River Wings, Inc., ¶ 37, 751 N.W.2d at 222.
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held that the business judgment rule prohibits judicial inquiry into the
actions of the corporate directors.131 Absent from the Red River Wings, Inc.
decision was language incorporating an omission to act by the directors.132
As a result, an argument could be made that if a director fails to act in a
timely manner and such inaction does not rise to a conscious decision to
refrain from acting, then the inaction would fall outside the scope of the
business judgment rule.
Delaware has adopted the position that absent a conscious decision to
refrain from acting, an omission to act falls outside the scope of the
business judgment rule.133 The Delaware statute pertaining to the ordinary
standard of care is substantially similar to that of North Dakota.134 The
Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted the Delaware statutes to mean that
the business judgment rule is limited to cases of action as opposed to
inaction or omissions.135 Thus, a director that fails to act, and such failure
is not a conscious decision to refrain from acting, will be adjudged by the
objective reasonable person standard in determining whether a director
breached his of her fiduciary duty.136
D. INDEMNIFICATION
In North Dakota, a corporation may indemnify a director for expenses
and liabilities arising out of a director’s duties, if the director acted in good
faith, and did not violate his or her duty of loyalty.137 Similarly, a corporation in Delaware is permitted to indemnify a director for any liability
arising out of his or her service as a director for actions in good faith.138
While indemnification does not absolve a director from liability, it permits
a director to be made whole for any loss or damages incurred as a result of a
fiduciary duty suit against him or her, so long as indemnification is not
statutorily precluded.139

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
134. Id.
135. In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch., 1996).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(1) (2007).
137. See id. § 10-19.1-91(2) (explaining that corporations may indemnify directors if a director did not receive an improper benefit).
138. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(k) (2005).
139. Id.
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SUMMARY OF INTERNAL LIABILITY

The potential for internal liability for a director in North Dakota
appears to be de minimis.140 The corporation has the authority to limit or
reduce personal liability for monetary damages based upon breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to either the corporation or shareholders.141 The corporation is prohibited, however, from reducing or eliminating a director’s
monetary culpability as it relates to the breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty,
good faith, or receiving improper personal benefits.142 If a director’s act
falls outside one of the three exceptions, the director can avoid personal
monetary damages for his or her conduct.143
If the corporation or shareholder alleges that a director breached either
the duty of loyalty, good faith, or obtained an improper personal benefit, the
director’s conduct will be adjudged against the business judgment rule.144
While the business judgment rule does not shield a director from liability,
there is a presumption that a director acted on an informed basis and in
good faith.145 As a result, it is much more challenging for a corporation or
shareholder to rebut the presumption and prevail on their claim.146 The
business judgment rule is inapplicable in cases where a director has abdicated his or her duties or, absent a cognitive decision, failed to act.147 If a
director either abdicated his or her duties or failed to act and that failure was
not a conscious decision, then the ordinary reasonable person standard of
care would likely apply.148
III. COMPARING NORTH DAKOTA AND DELAWARE
North Dakota enacted a broad definition of a director’s fiduciary duty,
permitting the director to consider numerous other factors in the determination of good faith.149 In material contrast, the Delaware Legislature did not
integrate the corporate constituency statutes enacted by the North Dakota
Legislature.150 Rather, the determination of good faith is left to the
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5).
141. Id.
142. See id. § 10-19.1-50(5)(a)-(d) (explaining that directors cannot be reimbursed for
breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, or receiving improper benefits).
143. Id.
144. Red River Wings, Inc. v. Hoot, Inc. 2008 ND 117, ¶ 37, 751 N.W.2d 206, 222.
145. Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E. 2d 587, 592-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
146. Id. at 593.
147. Id. at 592.
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(1).
149. Id. § 10-19.1-50(6).
150. Janette Meredith Wester, Achieving A Proper Economic Balance: Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 19 STETSON L. REV. 581, 611 (1990).
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courts.151 In deciding the scope of the fiduciary duty of good faith, the
Delaware Chancery Courts have held that there are two separate duties
inherent within the fiduciary duty.152 The first duty focuses on the procedural aspect of the information gathering process, centering on a director’s
requirement to use due diligence in making business decisions.153 The
second type of breach of duty occurs when a director makes a decision that
exceeds the bounds of reasonable judgment and appears inexplicable.154
While there are material differences in relation to the responsibilities
associated with the duty of good faith, there are many similarities between
North Dakota and Delaware pertaining to the potential internal liability of
the directors. One similarity includes the statutory language pertaining to
the fiduciary duty of care and loyalty.155 In both states, directors are
entitled to rely on reports from committees and other professionals acting
within their scope of expertise in making decisions.156 Moreover, the mere
appearance of a conflict will not make a transaction void or voidable, and
may be cured by a majority vote coupled with full disclosure of the
conflict.157
Both states have a similar view on director liability for gross
negligence. The Delaware Chancery Courts have held that the statutory
language permits the corporation to eliminate a director’s monetary liability
to the corporation and shareholders for acts of gross negligence that do not
fall under the purview of bad faith.158 The statutory language contained
within the North Dakota statute is similarly phrased.159 A plain reading of
the North Dakota statute would similarly allow the corporation to eliminate
a director’s liability for gross negligence.160 The North Dakota courts,
however, have not addressed a director’s liability for gross negligence and
whether that culpability can be limited or eliminated.
Finally, both states have adopted the business judgment rule as the
standard by which to measure a director’s actions in a subsequent

151. Id.
152. See Grossman, supra note 17, at 397.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 410.
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2005).
156. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e).
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-51(2)(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a).
158. John Hancock Capital Growth Mgmt, Inc., v. Aris Corp., Civ. A. No. 9920, 1990 WL
126656, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1990).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-51(5).
160. See id. § 10-19.1-51 (prohibiting a corporation from eliminating director liability for
breach of good faith, loyalty, or from transactions in which director received direct benefit).
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lawsuit.161 The scope of the business judgment rule in North Dakota is still
relatively unknown as a result of the limited case law, as opposed to
Delaware which has addressed the scope and application of the rule in
several cases.162 One of the more relevant issues is whether the business
judgment rule is the applicable standard in cases of inaction, whereby a
director neglects to make a decision.163 The Delaware courts have concluded that the business judgment rule only applies to actions, and is
inapplicable in cases involving inactivity.164 In that event, the appropriate
standard of care would revert to the reasonable person standard.165
A. NORTH DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT
The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act added chapter 1035 to the North Dakota Century Code.166 The Act is applicable to corporations incorporated after July 1, 2007, that elect to be subject to chapter 1035.167 The Act provides minority shareholders with increased protections
within the corporation.168 Under the Act, the CEO of the corporation is
prohibited from serving as the chair of the board.169 This serves to increase
the independence of the board from the officers and serves as a safeguard
against a self-serving rouge director. Moreover, the separation minimizes
the appearance of impropriety and helps allow the board to conduct its
business in a neutral and impartial manner.170 A few of the other hallmark
changes include mandating reimbursement to shareholders to the extent
they are successful in contesting the election of directors;171 allowing shareholders owning more than five percent of the shares to propose amendments
to the articles of incorporation;172 and imposing limitations on poison
pills.173 In addition, the Act prohibits the articles or bylaws from fixing

161. Lill v. Cavalier Rural Elec. Coop., 456 N.W.2d 527, 530 (N.D. 1990) (citing
Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 554 (N.Y. 1990)).
162. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993); Moran v. Household
Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
163. Grossman, supra note 17, at 406.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-01.
167. North Dakota Corporate Governance Council, Explanation of the North Dakota Publicly
Corporations Act (2007), available at http://ndcgc.org/Reference/Explain405.pdf.
168. Id.
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-06 (4).
170. See id. (requiring a separation between the executive officers and chairman of the
board).
171. Id. § 10-35-10(1).
172. Id. § 10-35-15.
173. Id. §§ 10-35-22 to -25.
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director’s terms in excess of one year and disallowing the staggering of
board terms.174
B. CONGRUENCY BETWEEN DIRECTOR LIABILITY & THE
NORTH DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT
While the NDPTCA allows corporations the option of being governed
under the new legislation, there are inconsistencies with the current
interpretation of statutory law, which must be addressed before North
Dakota becomes a true shareholder friendly state. In North Dakota, the
current status of the law makes it extremely difficult for a shareholder to
successfully win an action against a director who breaches a fiduciary
duty.175 First, a director’s conduct is measured against the corporate constituency statutes, broadening the definition of the best interest of the corporation by taking a totality approach.176 Second, the standard by which the
conduct is measured is removed from the objective reasonable person
standard and is measured against the more liberal subjective standard found
in the business judgment rule.177 The business judgment standard serves as
a safeguard from judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of a director’s
actions.178 Finally, the shareholder must be cognitive when the corporation
is incorporating in North Dakota as it is permissible to limit or eliminate the
fiduciary duty, with the exception of the before mentioned duties, making it
more difficult to sustain an action against a director.179
IV. EXTERNAL LIABILITY
The external liability component of the analysis focuses on the liability
of a director to aggrieved parties outside the corporation. As a general rule,
directors are shielded from incurring personal liability for the debts of a
corporation, which is a fundamental principal of the corporation.180 However, there are instances in which the aggrieved creditor is permitted to
pierce the corporate veil and impose personal liability on the directors in

174. See id. § 10-35-06 (stating that the limit in regard to director term limits in corporations
which do not elect to be governed under the Act is five years).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 539 (N.Y. 1990).
178. Gevurtz, supra note 117, at 306-07 (discussing the standard under ordinary negligence
and the business judgment rule).
179. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5).
180. Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Ill. App. Ct., 1981).
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order to satisfy the judgment against the corporation.181 The concept of
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy by which the court will
permit the aggrieved creditor to pierce the limited liability protection.182
Once a corporate veil is pierced, shareholders and directors are exposed to
personal liability for the debts of the corporation.183 The concept is based
upon the bedrock concept of limited liability.184
A. LIMITED LIABILITY
The concept of limited liability is a deeply rooted prescript dating back
to 1819.185 The doctrine prescribes that certain forms of entities provide the
stakeholders with limited liability in regard to debts and liabilities that arise
from the ordinary course of business.186 The premise for shielding the
shareholder from personal liability for the organization’s financial responsibilities is based upon the concept that the business is considered a legal
fiction and treated as a separate entity under all ordinary circumstances.187
The result is to sever personal liability to the extent of the shareholder’s
investment, usually comprised of capital contributions.188 The scope of the
protection withstands claims arising from torts committed by agents or
employees of the entrepreneur in the ordinary course of business, as well as
debts incurred from the operations of the business.189 While the limited
liability attribute does not shield a director or shareholder from personal
liability for his or her own torts, it shields them from personal liability for
the acts of their agents that would otherwise have been incurred under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.190
There are three different business structures that clothe the officers,
directors, and investors with the limited liability attribute.191 Those three
business structures are: the corporation, the limited liability corporation,
and the different limited liability partnerships.192 In each of these
181. Id. Examples in which an aggrieved creditor may pierce the corporate veil include
situations in which fraud was used to commit a transaction, and when a business is grossly
undercapitalized. Id.
182. Id. at 255.
183. Id. at 254.
184. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 111 (S.D. 1994).
185. Id. at 111 n.4.
186. Danks v. Holland, 246 N.W.2d 86, 90 (N.D. 1976).
187. Consumer’s Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Wis. 1988).
188. Escobedo v. BHM Health Assocs., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930, 932 (Ind. 2004).
189. Id.
190. Hagen v. Am. Agency, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2001).
191. Thomas E. Rutledge, Limited Liability (or not): Reflections on the Holy Grail, 51 S.D.
L. REV. 417, 425-30 (2006).
192. Id.
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organizations, the investors’ liability for the debts of the organization is
limited to their respective investments.193 If the assets of the business are
insufficient to satisfy the aggrieved creditor’s claims, the directors and
investors are generally immune from having their personal assets attached
to satisfy the remaining debt.194 However, if the aggrieved creditor is able
to meet the criteria established by the state, the court will impose personal
liability based upon the equitable theory of piercing the corporate veil or the
concept of treating the organization as an alter ego.195 Prior to successfully
imputing liability to a director, the aggrieved creditor must vicariously attach liability to the corporation.196 This is accomplished under the concept
of respondeat superior.197
B. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The concept of respondeat superior is the ascribing of liability for those
who hire employees to further the mission of the practice.198 In order to
provide the aggrieved creditor with sufficient resources to address the
injury, the creditor is permitted to sue the business under the concept of
respondeat superior.199 This concept is the attribution of liability to an
employer for the action of the employee.200 Under this concept, the injured
person imputes liability to the principal for the acts of the agent.201 The
principal is the party that permits a person to act on its behalf while the
agent is a person who has authority to act for the principal.202 In its most
rudimentary form, the concept of respondeat superior refers to the
employee/employer relationship.203 The employee serves as the agent
while the employer serves as the principal.204 If the employee has authority
to act on behalf of the principal, an agency relationship is created.205

193. Danks v. Holland, 246 N.W.2d 86, 90 (N.D. 1976).
194. Id.
195. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 111 (S.D. 1994).
196. Cooperstein v. Patrician Estates, Inc., 465 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
197. Id.
198. N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-03-09 (2007); Doan v. City of Bismarck, 2001 ND 152, ¶ 19, 632
N.W.2d 815, 822.
199. Brian P. Winrow, The Entrepreneurial Executive, 13 THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
EXECUTIVE 63, 64 (2008).
200. Doan, ¶ 19, 632 N.W.2d at 822.
201. Zimprich v. Broekel, 519 N.W.2d 588, 590 (N.D. 1994).
202. Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc, 86 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
203. Bradley P. Humphreys, Assessing the Viability and Virtues of Respondeat Superior for
Nonfiduciary Responsibility in ERISA Actions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1689 (2008).
204. Id.
205. See Winrow, supra note 200, at 64.

1128

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:1109

Once the agency relationship is established, vicarious liability is the
tool by which personal liability is imputed to the principal.206 Vicarious
liability involves imposing liability on the principal for the wrongful
conduct of an agent.207 In the organizational context, the business incurs
vicarious liability for the acts of the agent, assuming the agent had the
appropriate authority and was acting within his or her scope of employment.208 Once the aggrieved party vicariously imputes liability to the business, the creditor can attach the business’ assets in satisfaction of the
debt.209 However, if the business has insufficient assets to satisfy the
aggrieved party, the creditor may be able to attach the personal assets of the
investors.210 This issue is dependant upon the business structure of the
organization. If the business does not contain a limited liability attribute,
the creditor can attach the personal assets of the owners.211 However, if the
business contains a limited liability attribute, the creditor is generally
prevented from attaching the personal assets of the directors and shareholders.212 Where the business contains a limited liability attribute, the
creditor can only attach the personal assets of investors by successfully
piercing the corporate veil.213
C. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
The fundamental premise with respect to the imposition of personal
liability imputed to stakeholders in a limited liability entity for the business’
debts is that, by legal fiction, the business is a separate entity and is treated
as such under all ordinary circumstances.214 While the presumption in
favor of limited liability is not lightly disregarded, there are situations in
which piercing the corporate veil is deemed appropriate.215 A party seeking
to disregard the corporate entity bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the business is merely a corporate façade and
must be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice to the plaintiff.216 Only

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
2006).

N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-03-09 (2007).
Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Wis. 2004).
Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141(Alaska 1972).
Id.
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 111 (S.D. 1994).
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id.
Consumer’s Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Wis. 1988).
Id.
Lascsak v. Hollingsworth, No. A-04-666, 2006 WL 786455, at *4 (Neb. App. Mar. 28,
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then will courts reluctantly pierce the corporate veil.217 The determination
of whether the business is merely a corporate façade is determined on a
case-by-case basis in light of the facts presented.218
1.

North Dakota

North Dakota has adopted a balancing test consisting of several factors
in order to ascertain whether a corporation should be pierced.219 The nine
factors considered when determining whether equity demands piercing the
corporate veil include: (1) undercapitalization; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) insolvency of debtor corporation at the time of the transaction; (5) siphoning of funds by a dominant
shareholder; (6) nonfunctioning of directors; (7) absence of corporate
records; (8) using the corporate shell as a mere façade to conduct personal
transactions; and (9) use of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice, or
illegality.220
2.

Delaware

In Delaware, the factors contained within the balancing test are similar
to the factors contained within the North Dakota analysis. The Delaware
factors include: (1) whether the corporation was adequately capitalized for
the corporate undertaking; (2) whether the corporation was solvent; (3)
whether dividends were paid; (4) whether adequate records were
maintained; (5) whether officers and directors functioned properly; (6)
whether the officers and directors complied with corporate formalities; (7)
whether the dominant shareholder siphoned corporate funds; and (8)
whether the corporation simply functioned as a façade for the dominant
shareholder.221 Each of the factors within the North Dakota and Delaware
balancing tests are individually analyzed, starting with undercapitalization,
to ascertain the respective scrutiny afforded to the respective component.
a.

Undercapitalization

In order to be afforded limited liability protection, shareholders must
invest a reasonable amount of capital for the nature of the business involved

217. In re Estate of Wallen, 633 N.E.2d 1350, 1357 (Ill. App.1994).
218. Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Bldg. Systems, Inc., 780 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1986).
219. Hilzendager v. Skwarok, 335 N.W.2d 768, 774 (N.D. 1983).
220. Id.
221. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc., CIV. A. No. 1131, 1989 WL 110537, at *4
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1989).
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to meet prospective liabilities.222 If an organization is severely undercapitalized, as measured by the nature and extent of the organization’s
endeavor, it will serve as a key factor in denying shareholders the defense
of limited liability.223 However, an entity that was sufficiently capitalized
at formation but suffers losses is not per se undercapitalized.224 On the
other hand, a business that was adequately capitalized for the initial undertaking may become undercapitalized if the corporation significantly expands the scope of the business without a new infusion of capital.225
The weight afforded to the undercapitalization factor differs from state
to state.226 The majority of states have held undercapitalization alone is
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil.227 In these states undercapitalization serves as a mere cog in the analysis, and thus an insufficient basis in
and of itself to expose shareholders or directors to personal liability for the
debt of the entity.228 Even the states that require more than insufficient
capital to pierce the corporate veil concur that evidence of inadequate
capital is a substantial factor in the overall analysis.229 In contrast, a minority of states will permit the corporate veil to be pierced upon a showing of
undercapitalization.230
The purpose of this factor is to prohibit an organization that is formed
or carries on business without sufficient assets available to meet its financial obligations.231 In this situation, it would be inequitable to permit the
shareholders to escape personal liability to the detriment of the aggrieved
creditors.232 The attempt to do so circumvents the spirit of the law and it is
thus, ineffectual to exempt the shareholders from the business’ liabilities.233
As a result, shareholders must risk unencumbered capital reasonably
222. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 566 (N.D. 1985) (citing Briggs Transp. Co. v.
Starr Sales Co., 262 N.W.2d 805, 810 (Iowa 1978)).
223. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 115 (S.D. 1994).
224. Id.
225. Consumer’s Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Wis. 1988).
226. See Curtis v. Feurhelm, 335 N.W.2d 575, 576 (S.D. 1983) (finding undercapitalization
in South Dakota is a mere factor relevant to piercing the corporate veil); Consumer’s Co-op., 419
N.W.2d at 217 (stating that while significant, undercapitalization is not an independently
sufficient ground to pierce the corporate veil).
227. Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply, 664 N.E.2d 328, 332 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996);
Sansone v. Moseley, 912 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Southern Lumber & Coal v. M.
P. Olson Real Estate, 426 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Neb. 1988); Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560,
565 (N.D. 1985); LeRoux’s Billyle Supper Club v. Ma, 602 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991); Consumer’s Co-op, 419 N.W.2d at 213.
228. See, e.g., Jacobson, 664 N.E.2d at 332; Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 565.
229. Curtis, 335 N.W.2d at 576; Consumer’s Co-op., 419 N.W.2d at 217.
230. Sansone, 912 S.W.2d at 669.
231. Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 566.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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adequate to cover the businesses prospective debts.234 Moreover, if the
invested capital is merely illusory in comparison to the potential risks of
loss, the court will have sufficient evidence to permit the piercing of the
corporate veil.235 The result would expose the stakeholders to personal
liability in order to satisfy an aggrieved creditor.236
While North Dakota has not directly addressed the issue, it appears
from the limited precedence that North Dakota concurs with the majority of
states that undercapitalization only qualifies as a mere cog in the overall
balancing test.237 Moreover, North Dakota adopted the first eight factors of
its balancing test from Minnesota.238 In Minnesota, the courts have held
that a number of the factors within the balancing test must be present in
order to warrant the piercing of the corporate veil.239 As a result, in North
Dakota, undercapitalization alone is insufficient to warrant the piercing of
the corporate veil.240
In Gadsden v. Home Preservation Co.,241 the Delaware Chancery
Court addressed the issue of inadequate capitalization.242 Evidence was
presented that the defendant signed contracts and issued warranties in the
name of the contractor, but the contractor had no assets, as all of the assets
and capital were held by the owner.243 From the businesses inception, and
by design, the corporation never had any measurable economic value.244
The company never received an allocation of initial capitalization, and its
stock never had any value.245 The corporation never owned any assets, including tools, equipment, or inventory.246 Moreover, the corporation’s sole
stockholder and employee ensured that the corporation’s bank account contained minimal funds.247 Even though the company had no economic value,
it routinely furnished to its customers contracts containing ten- to twentyyear workmanship warranties.248 The suppliers who were aware of this

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See generally id. (finding it was proper to pierce the corporate veil on a number of
factors, not just the undercapitalization factor).
238. Id. at 564.
239. Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979).
240. Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 564.
241. No. Civ.A. 1888, 2004 WL 485468 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2004).
242. Gadsden, 2004 WL 485468, at *3.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. Id. at *4.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *3.
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practice refused to extend the corporation credit by requiring the defendant
to personally pay for all materials.249 Unlike those suppliers, the plaintiff,
however, was unable to protect herself as she was unaware of these practices.250 Based upon these facts, the court found that the business was
severely undercapitalized, and allowed the plaintiff to pierce the corporate
veil, thus imposing personal liability on the plaintiff.251
b.

Failure to Observe Corporate Formalities

The second factor within the corporate piercing balancing test is the
shareholder’s failure to observe corporate formalities.252 The failure to
observe the corporate formalities serves as evidence that the limited liability
business was a mere instrumentality of the shareholder(s) and was not
treated as an entity separate from its owners.253 In other words, when the
shareholder(s) of a business disregard the corporate entity, the courts may
follow suit.254 While corporate formalities must be observed, the mere
failure to occasionally follow all the formalities prescribed by law is insufficient to justify the disregarding of the corporate entity.255 There must
either be a pattern or an egregious disregard of the corporate formalities
before the court will permit the plaintiff to attach personal liability to the
stakeholder.256 When courts disregard the corporate entity based upon lack
of formalities, it is frequently based on cases where adequate records were
not maintained and the business neglected to hold any shareholder or
director meetings.257
As a result, some states have lessened the formality requirement for
small businesses. For example, North Dakota has recognized the hardship
that the stringent formalities impose on small entities seeking the protection
of limited liability, but lacking the size and complexity of a prototypical
corporation to warrant such unwavering formalities.258 In response, North
Dakota has lessened some of the more common formalities traditionally
found in other states statutes, such as not requiring the corporation to draft

249. Id. at *4.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *6.
252. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985).
253. Cmty. Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d 559, 564-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
254. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 115 (S.D. 1994).
255. Curtis v. Feurhelm, 335 N.W.2d 575, 576-77 (S.D. 1983).
256. Id.
257. See Ted Harrison Oil Co. v. Dokka, 617 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding
the defendant neglected to maintain any records and failed to hold any director of shareholder
meetings).
258. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-31(1) (2007) (stating bylaws are not required).
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bylaws.259 In Delaware, required formalities include filing separate tax
returns, maintaining separate books and not commingling personal funds
with corporate funds.260 Moreover, the Delaware court has held that the
failure to maintain adequate records is strong evidence that there was a
failure to maintain corporate formalities.261
c.

Nonpayment of Dividends

The third factor in the balancing test relates to the nonpayment of
dividends.262 While the failure to pay dividends can be construed as evidence of a sinister motive or the business being conducted as the alter ego
of its shareholders, it can also serve a legitimate business purpose.263 When
a corporation earns money it is permitted to either make taxable distributions to its stockholders, known as dividends, or it may retain the earnings.264 When a corporation retains earnings, it is reinvesting the profits
into the business.265 The retained earnings can then be used for legitimate
business purposes, including buying back outstanding shares of stock,
paying debt, or financing expansion.
d.

Insolvency of the Corporation at Time of the Transaction

The fourth factor is whether the corporation was insolvent at the time
of the transaction.266 In Aiken v. Timm,267 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that transactions that occur during a period of insolvency have the
appearance of impropriety as they can be used to improperly dispose of
assets from valid creditors.268 According to Delaware case law, “the fact
which creates the trust [for the benefit of creditors] is the insolvency, and
when that fact is established, the trust arises, and the legality of the acts
thereafter performed will be decided by very different principles than in the

259. Id.
260. David v. Mast, No. 1369-K, 1999 WL 135244, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1999).
261. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1131, 1989 WL 110537, at *6
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1989).
262. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985) (citing Victoria Elevator Co. v.
Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979)).
263. Almac, Inc. v. JRH Dev., Inc., 391 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Snyder Electric Co. v. Fleming, 305 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn.1981)).
264. See Snyder Electric Co., 305 N.W.2d at 868 (explaining that it is common for closely
held corporations to retain earnings).
265. Id.
266. Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 563.
267. 180 N.W. 234, 235 (Minn. 1920).
268. Aiken, 180 N.W. at 235; Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863
A.2d 772, 782-83 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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case of solvency.”269 In Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co.,270 the Delaware
Chancery Court stated that insolvency occurs when a corporation’s assets
have sunk below the amount of its debts, as opposed to insolvency due to a
statutory filing.271
e.

Siphoning of Funds by the Dominant Shareholder

The fifth factor in the balancing test is whether the dominant shareholder siphoned funds from the corporation.272 In the North Dakota
landmark case of Jablonsky v. Klemm,273 the North Dakota Supreme Court
articulated the type of evidence sufficient to satisfy the siphoning element.274 In Jablonsky, the defendant purchased two incomplete apartment
units for less than fair market value, had them completed, and subsequently
sold them and retained a profit of $27,000.275 The evidence established that
the defendant’s other business furnished carpet and kitchen cabinets for the
project and made a thirteen percent profit on the $78,000 in cabinets
furnished to the corporation.276 In its holding, the court noted, “although
the amount of siphoning was not large in relation to the total sales of the
company, the amount was large in relation to the capital.”277 Finally, the
court concluded that the fact the defendant “siphoned” any funds was more
significant than the amount.278
f.

Nonfunctioning of Directors

The sixth factor in the balancing test relates to nonfunctioning of the
directors.279 As previously stated, the role of the directors is to oversee the
business affairs of the corporation.280 Directors help establish the independence between the corporation and the shareholder. In return for their services, directors generally avoid liability for their decisions made in good
faith, as well as for the debts of the corporation.281 The element of a
269. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. 1992) (citing Bovay v. H.
M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944)).
270. 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944).
271. Bovay, 38 A.2d at 813.
272. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985).
273. 377 N.W.2d 560 (N.D. 1985).
274. Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 567.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 563.
280. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-32(1) (2007).
281. Buckingham v. Weston Village Homeowners Ass’n, 1997 ND 237, 571 N.W.2d 842,
844.
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nonfunctioning director is often related to the corporate formality factor.282
Corporate formalities include factors such as holding annual director meetings and actively overseeing the corporation’s affairs.283
In exchange for limited liability protection, the shareholders must observe appropriate formalities by those controlling a corporation.284 Observing corporate formalities demonstrates that those in control of a corporation
treat the corporation as a separate and distinct entity and have an expectation that the traditional attributes associated with a corporation will be
afforded to it.285 When the formalities are not respected, the legal fiction
that is the corporation diminishes and the expectation that others would
treat it as a distinct, liability-limiting entity becomes less reasonable.286
g.

Inadequate Corporate Records

The seventh factor included within the balancing test is whether
adequate corporate records were maintained.287 A corporation must maintain accurate financial and accounting records, as well as minutes from the
shareholder and board of director meetings.288 Failure to maintain these
records serves as evidence that the corporation is merely an alter ego of the
shareholder.289 With the advent of hybrid business structures such as the
limited liability company and the statutory close corporation, the record
keeping requirements have diminished in many of the states that have
adopted such legislation.290 As discussed, some states have abolished the
requirement that the corporation elect a board of directors, hold annual
shareholder or board of director meetings, and draft bylaws.291 In these

282. Roof Depot v. S.A.I. Constr., No. C2-96-1164, 1996 WL 745279, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 1996).
283. MINN. STAT. § 302A.231, subdiv. 1 (1996).
284. Id.
285. David v. Mast, No. 1369-K, 1999 WL 135244, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1999).
286. Id.
287. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985).
288. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-53 (2007).
289. Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 781 (Tex. App. 2003).
290. William S. Hochstetler & Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations-An
Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?,
10 J. CORP. L. 849, 997 (1985); see also TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.37(F)(1) (Vernon
2007) (stating that under Texas law failure to observe traditional corporate formalities will not be
considered in determining whether to impose personal liability); Remillong v. Schneider, 185
N.W.2d 493, 495 (N.D. 1971) (holding that shareholders may waive the requirement of formal
board of director meetings).
291. Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for
a Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 51, 76 (2004).
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states, the factors would be reduced to maintaining a record of shareholders,
and adequate financial and accounting records.292
h.

Corporate Shell as Mere Façade for Personal Transactions

The eighth factor included within the balancing test is whether the
business is serving as a mere façade for the stakeholder’s personal transactions.293 A corporation is a mere façade when it possesses the corporate
shell, but only serves as protection for the transactions of an individual.294
This issue is highlighted in Jablonsky, where the corporation only served as
a pass-through corporation for the defendant’s personal transactions.295 In
Jablonsky, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined whether the corporation had any employees, equipment, or property.296 The absence of the
assets is indicative of a corporation serving as a mere façade.297 Another
consideration is whether the shareholder used corporate funds for personal
purposes, or commingled corporate and personal accounts.298 When a
shareholder is paying personal expenses out of corporate accounts, or fails
to open a separate account for the corporation, such evidence is indicative
of a shareholder that does not treat the entity as a separate being.299 Courts
generally scrutinize activity such as: using business credit cards for both
personal and business expenses; using a corporate checking account to pay
for personal expenses; and using corporate funds to purchase personal services.300 The purpose of the analysis under this factor is to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and to allow the courts to ascertain the amount of
funds associated with the entity to ensure creditors have full access to
corporate funds.301
The façade factor analyzes the defendant’s conduct to determine
whether the owner treated the corporation as the owner’s alter ego, for the
purpose of avoiding liability.302 It serves as a general analysis of the

292. Id. at 66.
293. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985).
294. Id. at 567.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 566.
298. Cmty. Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d 559, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
299. Id.
300. Gilleard v. Nelson, No. 03-1496, 2005 WL 2756042, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 26,
2005).
301. See id. (stating that the corporate veil will be pierced to achieve a just and honest
result).
302. Mason v. Network of Wilmington, Inc., No. Civ.A. 19434-NC, 2005 WL 1653954, at
*3 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2005).

2008]

DIRECTOR LIABILITY

1137

owner’s conduct and is often synonymous with fraud or injustice.303 In the
façade analysis, no single factor is dominant, resulting in a holistic
analysis.304
i.

Fraud, Injustice, or Illegality

The final factor in the analysis is whether the corporation was used to
further fraud, injustice, or illegality.305 When the entity is used in a manner
that thwarts public sentiment, protects fraud, or defends crime, sufficient
reason exists to pierce the corporate veil.306 However, the showing of inequity must arise from the malfeasance of the corporation.307 Moreover, the
mere breach of a contract is insufficient to hold an individual shareholder
personally liable for the monetary obligations of the business.308 This does
not mean the stakeholder is prohibited from forming a limited liability
entity to escape personal liability, as the limited liability entity was created
for that purpose.309 Rather, it means the corporation is bound by the
constraints of fair play and common decency.310
The prohibition against misrepresentation is intended to prevent
entrepreneurs from being clothed with limited liability, resulting in unjust
enrichment as a consequence of their misdeeds.311 The act of fraud can be
actual or constructive.312 Actual fraud consists of inducing another party to
enter into a contract by intentionally misleading or deceiving the party.313
In material contrast, constructive fraud consists of a breach of duty absent
actual fraudulent intent, which unjustly enriches the breaching party by misleading another to her detriment.314 North Dakota, however, only requires
that some element of unfairness exists.315 Such a requirement is less stringent than the fraud element.316

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985).
306. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D. 1994).
307. Id. at 113 (citing Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (10th Cir.1993)).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Brevet Int’l, Inc. v. Great Plains Luggage Co., 2000 SD 5, ¶ 17, 604 N.W.2d 268, 272
(citing McDonough v. Kahle, 1999 SD 14, ¶ 17, 588 N.W.2d 600, 603; Sperry Corp. v. Schaeffer,
394 N.W.2d 727, 731 (S.D. 1986)).
313. Id. (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-4-5 (2008)).
314. Id. (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-4-6).
315. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563-64 (N.D. 1985).
316. Id.
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V. FEDERAL REGULATORY STATUTES
Prior to the corporate scandals that diminished the public’s confidence
in corporate America, the issue of corporate governance structures was primarily governed by state law.317 In the wake of the corporate scandals, the
federal government passed legislation implementing requirements pertaining to corporate governance through the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.318 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, did not expressly preempt state law as the primary source of the corporate governance system.319
As a result, any right to enforce those mandates is expected to come from
state fiduciary duty law, the primary avenue available to stockholders to
enforce directors’ duties.320
VI. CONCLUSION
Even as the issue of corporate responsibility and accountability has
been at the forefront of debate, the scope of potential liability incurred by a
director in North Dakota appears to be minimal in light of the statutory
language and limited case law that has emerged with regard to this issue.321
North Dakota has adopted broad protections to protect a director from
incurring personal liability when acting on behalf of the corporation.
Directors are permitted to escape liability for breach of their fiduciary
duties, such as the duty of good faith, in corporations that have filed the
waiver with their articles of incorporation.322 In addition, North Dakota has
enacted corporate constituency statutes permitting the directors to escape
liability by relying on outside reports.323 Finally, a director’s transactions
are adjudged under the business judgment rule, thus removing their actions
from the ordinary negligence standard of care.324 While the business
judgment rule is not intended to shield a director from liability, it has the

317. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003) (stating that federal
security law plays a supporting role in facilitation of state corporate law).
318. J. Robert Brown Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 375 (2004).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See infra Part III (explaining that decisions made by the directors are analyzed under the
business judgment rule; moreover, liability for breach of director fiduciary duties can be waived).
322. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5)(a), (b) (2007).
323. Id. § 10-19.1-50(2).
324. Buckingham v. Weston Village Homeowners Ass’n, 571 N.W.2d 842, 844 (N.D. 1997).
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effect of adding another layer of protection against an aggrieved
shareholder.325
These broad protections afforded to a director are especially interesting
in light of the newly enacted North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations
Act.326 The purpose of this Act was to allow corporations to elect to be
governed under the “shareholder friendly” statutes, which provide the
shareholders with increased rights within the management and corporate
governance of the business.327 Even while the North Dakota Legislature
was able to enact a major overhaul, under which a corporation can elect to
be governed, the recourse available to the shareholders for the malfeasance
of a director is minimal at best. While the Act does afford shareholders
additional rights in the election of directors, it does little to hold directors
accountable for breaching their fiduciary duty, or for their negligence.
As it currently stands, the scope of a director’s liability in North
Dakota is substantially similar to a director’s scope of liability in Delaware.
In order to achieve its dual objective of providing additional minority shareholder rights, as well as attracting new businesses to incorporate within the
state, North Dakota needs to distinguish itself not only with the safeguards
afforded to the minority shareholders under the Act, but also by holding
directors personally liable for their malfeasance. This can be accomplished
by drafting additional statutes restricting the corporation’s ability to waive a
director’s liability and redefining the business judgment rule. These
statutes would serve to compliment the Act and serve to make North
Dakota a truly shareholder friendly state.

325. Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W. Dunfee & Michael J. Kline, Tone at the Top: An Ethics
Code for Directors?, 58 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 79, 79 (2005).
326. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-01.
327. Id.

